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Abstract. We present an overview of the Systems Engineering and Assurance Modeling 
(SEAM) platform, a web-browser-based tool which is designed to help engineers 
evaluate the radiation vulnerabilities and develop an assurance approach for electronic 
parts in space systems. The SEAM framework consists of three interconnected modeling 
tools, a SysML compatible system description tool, a Goal Structuring Notation (GSN) 
visual argument tool, and Bayesian Net and Fault Tree extraction and export tools. The 
SysML and GSN sections also have a coverage check application that ensures that every 
radiation fault identified on the SysML side is also addressed in the assurance case in 
GSN. The SEAM platform works on space systems of any degree of radiation hardness 
but is especially helpful for assessing radiation performance in systems with commercial-
off-the-shelf (COTS) electronic components.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The advent of the small spacecraft or CubeSat has enabled much greater access to space 
at relatively low cost. CubeSats can be rapidly assembled from a variety of available 
commercial off the shelf electronic (COTS) subsystems to fulfill spacecraft functions, from 
sensors to command and data handling. Clearly CubeSats or similar space systems with 
majority COTS parts require a new paradigm for mission assurance of the system that is 
compatible to cost, schedule, and development constraints of the “small” mission.  
Radiation assurance is of prime concern and depending on the mission requirements, the 
impact of single event effects (SEE), total ionizing dose (TID), and displacement damage 
dose (DDD) must be considered. While radiation testing is ever important, assurance 
models can be of significant value to CubeSat development in providing for mission 
success. In this regard, the Systems Engineering and Assurance Modeling (SEAM) 
platform1 has been developed and deployed in a collaborative NASA -University project. 
The benefits of Systems Engineering for small spacecraft, even at the fundamental level 
of capability, are well documented by INCOSE [1]. Systems Modeling Language (SysML) 
starter models for CubeSats are available and in use [2, 3]. Further, standards for these 
models are emerging [4].  In addition, we can see the benefits of building assurance models 
as SysML has continued to increasing usage [5, 6].  Assurance models focused on failure 
mitigation are needed to complement Systems Engineering models to improve success 
rates, as many CubeSat missions have failed. 
An assurance platform for small missions presents several challenges unique to the 
modeling environment. As indicated, the platform must be able to provide rapid analysis results 
compatible with the CubeSat development environment and workstyle. Furthermore, the tool 
must have low barriers to entry, both in terms of cost and usability. Other desirable features 
include standard graphical representations with well-defined visual syntax, embedded guidance 
focused on assurance, a collaborative web-based implementation, flexibility in modeling, and 
interoperability with other platforms. For these reasons, WebGME2: a web--based environment 
for creating domain-specific modeling tools, emerged as an excellent foundation for 
implementing SEAM and for evaluating concepts for Model Based Assurance for small 
missions. However, the graphical constructs presented herein as a part of SEAM are generic 
and not necessarily exclusive to any implementation framework. Currently, a free version of 
SEAM is maintained at modelbasedassurance.org.  
The modeling and analysis platform encompasses the necessary components for an easy-
to-use, flexible, mission assurance tool. Models constructed using the platform represent the 
subject system from various aspects. Each modeling aspect is subsequently described in terms 
of its graphical constructs that represent concepts of a small mission assurance framework. This 
is followed by descriptions of the use and deployment of the platform, focusing on radiation 
assurance, and already successfully demonstrated capabilities of SEAM. 
 
1 https://modelbasedassurance.org/  
2 https://webgme.org/  
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2. THE GRAPHICAL CONSTRUCTS OF SEAM 
SEAM has several key components built around several modeling aspects and assurance 
flexibility that can be linked or used independently depending on user preferences. The SEAM 
approach encompasses:  
▪ SysML internal block diagrams to represent the system architecture models, extended 
with fault propagation, with limited SysML import capability 
▪ Functional decomposition models that relate system functions to individual 
components, which allow for the generation of reliability representations of the 
system including Bayesian Nets (BN) and auto generated fault trees exportable to 
other applications 
▪ Goal Structuring Notation (GSN) Assurance Case models that support NASA Standard 
8729.1A 
▪ Tools for exporting Bayesian net topologies and fault trees showing the probable impact 
of radiation on system performance in standard formats.  
SEAM allows for these models to be incorporated into a single project. Fig. 1 shows 
the top-level view of a SEAM project that contains all the models. On the left of the Fig. 
are reference materials including a GSN model of NASA’s R&M Objectives Hierarchy 
[7], templates for a requirements model, system level definitions including fault labels, 
links to useful external apps, and a project-specific library of components. These reference 
materials can make modeling in SEAM more user-friendly. In the center of Fig. 1 are the 
links to the different models: GSN, functional decomposition model, and SysML models. 
Each model exists independently of the others, though SEAM does allow for the models to 
be linked if desired. 
 
Fig. 1 Top level of a project folder. Contains the NASA R&M Standards, project definitions, 
relevant external applications, the project family library, functional decomposition 
model, system model and the GSN assurance model. 
4 K. L. RYDER, R. ALLES, G. KARSAI, ET AL. 
SysML and Assurance Extensions for SEAM 
SysML is widely used as a descriptive language for capturing the structure and 
dependencies of complex systems, consisting of a set of canonical diagrams that capture the 
system behavior. In SEAM, the SysML block diagram describes the architectural structure 
of a system. It focuses on the flow of power and data through a system instead of precise 
electrical connections. Fig. 2 shows a SysML diagram of a generic embedded system 
comprised of four subsystems: Power, sensor S1, microcontroller M1, and Output. Power 
connections are shown in black, and data connections are shown in green. The purpose of the 
system is to respond to an environmental stimulus and to change its state accordingly. Each 
block, or subsystem, can be as specific or abstract, as necessary. For example, the Power 
subsystem in this example is a higher level of abstraction and is comprised of a battery and 
three voltage regulators (shown in the lower part of Fig. 2). Sensor S1, on the other hand, is 
the lowest level of abstraction for that subsystem and represents a single component. 
 
Fig. 2 (Top) SysML block diagram of a generic embedded system that uses a sensor to 
determine the next state of the system. Each block represents an abstraction of a 
subsystem: Sensor subsystem (S1), Microcontroller subsystem (MC1), Output 
subsystem, and Power subsystem. (Bottom) Lower level abstraction of the Power 
subsystem. 
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Faults and anomalies can be modeled in lower-level subsystem abstractions. A simple fault 
model for the sensor is shown in Fig. 3, in which the blocks with “p” and “s” in them represent 
power and signal ports, respectively. The sensor takes in power through the Power In port and 
outputs a signal through the Sensor_Output port. Fault causes and anomalies are denoted by the 
“F” and “A” blocks and are used to show how faults originating in a component and the 
associated anomalies. For the sensor shown in Fig. 3 there are two fault causes, TID (Total 
Ionizing Dose) and SEE (Single Event Effect). TID leads to a Degraded Signal anomaly, while 
SEE leads to a Transient Incorrect Signal anomaly as well as High Current anomaly. Failures 
propagate out of a component and into other inter-connected components in the system. The 
labeled edges between the anomaly and the port show the failures propagating across 
component boundaries. The failure label corresponds to the propagating failure effect. 
 
Fig. 3 Sensor fault model. The sensor in this system is only concerned with two faults, 
Total Ionizing Dose and Single Event Effect. These faults produce anomalies that 
appear on the sensor’s output. 
SEAM allows for the creation of project libraries for both components and failure labels. 
Libraries of commonly used project features reduce the overall creation time of models and 
make modeling easier for new users. Fig. 4 shows the component library (left) and failure label 
 
Fig. 4 (Left) Parts library. Library of part models used in the system design. (Right) Failure 
Label Definition – List of labels for failures propagating across component boundary. 
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definitions for this example project. Four (4) components were identified as likely to be used 
multiple times in this system and were created as library templates. Whenever one of these 
components is used in the SysML model, an instance of that template is created. If changes need 
to be made to all the instances of a component, the template in the library can be modified and 
all instances will be updated. This makes it easy to update the models as components change. 
Failure labels are all defined in the project definitions to be used throughout the SysML model. 
For this example, a small number of generic failure labels were created to standardize the 
language used throughout the SysML model. 
Functional Decomposition Model 
Another diagram incorporated in SEAM that is not present in the standard SysML 
diagram set is the Functional Decomposition Model (FDM) shown in Fig. 5.  A system 
may have many functions. Functions are specific descriptions of system capability 
established by requirements or specifications. The functions serve as a key abstraction level 
for assessing reliability, availability, and safety of a system. In the FDM, functions (upper 
case F) are associated with sub-functions (lower case f), which in turn are associated with 
specific instances of components that support the sub-function. In Fig. 5, only one 
component is associated with each sub-function, in practice each sub-function can be 
associated with many component instances. The FDM is a hierarchical assignment of 
responsibility for the accomplishment of a function to sub-functions and components.  
 
Fig. 5 Functional Decomposition Model. The top-level function is supported by five 
primitive functions each of which is related to a component/ subsystem that 
implements it. 
As shown in Fig. 5 for a typical embedded system, the sub-functions nearly always involve 
power, probing the environment (sensing), calculating the system condition and response to the 
environment according to algorithms built into system software (computation), and constructing 
a response to the environment (actuation). Other typical embedded functions are user input and 
output, and remote communication, which could be added to this diagram, as necessary. In a 
space radiation environment, another typical subfunction would be mitigation of radiation 
effects, which assigns responsibility for mitigation measures to components such as voltage 
regulators or load switches to avoid single event latch up.  
The FDM creates a network or topology of the system correlation of system functions 
with component-level functionality. 
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GSN Assurance Case 
Goal Structuring Notation (GSN) assurance cases are used to document and develop 
assurance cases and can be developed in parallel with the SysML and Functional 
Decomposition models within the SEAM tool. References to the GSN Community Standard 
and NASA Std 8719.1A are provided within SEAM, and the NASA R&M Objectives 
Hierarchy (from NASA Std 8719.1A) is provided in GSN format for reference. More detail on 
the use of GSN are given in [8] and [9]. Fig. 6 shows the top-level view of the R&M Objectives 
Hierarchy, which provides a guide for developing GSN assurance cases and can be used as a 
starting point for users to develop their own GSN assurance cases. 
 
Fig. 6 A hierarchical view of the NASA R&M Objectives Hierarchy. 
A simplified GSN assurance case for the generalized embedded system example is 
shown in Fig. 7. In this figure, The GSN nodes within red boxes come directly from the NASA 
R&M Hierarchy and were used as starting points for development of the more specific 
assurance case being made here. In this incomplete GSN assurance case, the argument for Goal 
2.2 has been completed while the other subgoals are still in development. Goal 2.2 applies to 
the Sensor Subsystem, and requires that the subsystem be tolerant to faults, failures, and 
other anomalous internal and external events. The strategy for meeting this goal, from the 
NASA R&M Hierarchy, is to prevent faults and failures or to provide mitigation for the 
faults and failures. Two subgoals were identified to meet this strategy, both related to the 
known radiation effects possible in the sensor. The solutions (or evidence to support) Goal 
2.2.1 and 2.2.2, total ionizing dose (TID) degradation and single event effects (SEE) errors, 
respectively, are found through radiation testing of the sensor. TID is found to not be a 
concern for the mission requirements in this project and SEEs are to be mitigated by the 
Microcontroller subsystem, which could involve another goal/strategy argument chain. 
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Both solutions are specific to this mission and if the requirements were to change, they 
would need to be reevaluated. 
 
Fig. 7 GSN Assurance Model:  A simplified GSN assurance argument model where the boxes 
in red indicate generic goals/ strategies advocated by NASA R&M standards. The other 
GSN nodes correspond to the specific system and its parts. 
System Reliability Models 
The integrated models in SEAM – the functional decomposition model, the system 
architecture model, and the underlying fault propagation model – can be translated into 
computational models that are part of the system reliability study. Currently SEAM models 
have been translated into fault tree models and Bayesian network models.  
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Fault tree models 
Fault trees [10] are graphical models that represent how low-level events, like 
component faults, combine and propagate to high-level events (like system-wide failures). 
The combination of the low–level events is expressed using an AND/OR tree-like structure. 
The extraction of fault trees, as well as other reliability artifacts, from SysML has been 
demonstrated as viable means of rapidly building reliability models [11, 12]. 
In this tree primary events are the leaves, intermediate nodes are either logical 
combinators (disjunctive or conjunctive) or intermediate (e.g. sub-system level) events, 
and the top (root) node of the tree is the system level event. The arrows connecting the 
nodes (from leaves towards the root) indicate causation or enablement. The AND/OR 
operators operate on probabilities of events assigned by the modeler. Fault-trees allow not 
only the review and logical analysis of how local faults combine and lead to system-level 
events, but also the calculation of the probability of those events as a function of the 
probabilities of the low-level events. Thus, they are very useful tools for evaluating the 
reliability of the system, and in design. For the latter, when the designer changes the system 
(e.g. by introducing redundancy), the fault tree can help the quantitative evaluation of how 
the reliability improves (or degrades).  
Fault Tree Generation 
The SEAM tool set includes generators that convert the SEAM model into a fault tree 
model. Initially, the fault tree is generated from the functional decomposition model. Each 
function is translated into a “Lost Function” intermediate or top event in the fault tree. The AND 
(OR) nodes in the fault tree correspond to the OR(AND) nodes in the functional decomposition 
model. A basic event-Lost Component (LC)-is introduced for each component node at the 
bottom of the functional decomposition model. The fault tree generated from the functional 
decomposition model is refined based on the system model and the underlying fault propagation 
model. Components with failure modes are converted to intermediate events and a basic event 
corresponding to each failure mode is added.  
The fault model is traversed starting from each of the failure modes. For each anomaly 
(AND/ OR) encountered in the path, a corresponding logic gate (AND/OR) is added to the 
fault tree. For each effect node encountered in the path, a corresponding logic relationship 
between the fault event and the lost function event is added to the fault tree (if it is not already 
present). For each response/ mitigation node encountered in the path, the fault tree is modified 
so that the failure mode event is blocked until the mitigation function is lost. Finally, the fault 
tree is simplified by eliminating logic gates that are redundant and unnecessary.  
Fig. 8 shows the fault tree generated from the Functional Decomposition Model 
(Fig. 5), the System Model (Fig. 2) and the underlying fault propagation model [13]. The 
top and intermediate level nodes colored in blue represent the events corresponding to the 
“Lost Function” (LF). The nodes in brown represent the events that correspond to the “Lost 
Component” (LC). Certain LC nodes are basic event (terminated with a circle) as the 
component models do not include any failure modes (e.g. LC_Power, LC_Output etc.). 
Other LC nodes are intermediate events as they are followed by basic events corresponding 
to the failure modes (nodes in red).  
When the fault propagation is arrested by a mitigation/ response function, the generated 
fault tree is modified. The failure mode events (FM_S1_SEE, FM_MC1_SEL) do not lead 
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to higher level events in the fault tree unless the mitigation function is lost (and the node 
with LF_Mitigation). 
The generated fault tree is output as an xml file in Open-PSA model exchange format 
so the fault tree can be evaluated in any FT evaluation platform. For example, the 
open-source SCRAM fault tree analysis engine can load the generated fault tree model to 
identify minimum cut sets, as well as risk analysis based on fault probabilities which could 
be used as evidences in the GSN assurance case models. 
 
Fig. 8 Fault Tree generated by SEAM based on the functional decomposition model, 
system model and the underlying fault propagation model. Boxes represent top-
event or intermediate event in the fault tree. Boxes with a circle below represent 
the basic event. Loss of Function (LF) events are in blue, Loss of component (LC) 
events are in brown and Failure mode events are in red. Triangle represents the 
loss of mitigation function. 
Bayesian Nets 
Bayesian (Belief) Networks (BN) are a graphical formalism for representing and 
implementing probabilistic inference networks [14, 15]. Bayesian nets are directed acyclic 
graphs, with 3 types of nodes: nodes without inputs (‘leaves’), nodes without outputs (‘top’), 
and nodes with both inputs and outputs (‘intermediate nodes’). Each node represents a random 
(probabilistic) variable in a system. Leaf nodes can be assigned a ‘prior’ probability value for 
each possible value of the random variable. An intermediate or ‘top’ node can be assigned a 
table of conditional probability values that determine the probability distribution for the value 
of that node as a function of the probability of the nodes attached to the incoming edges. The 
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BN performs probabilistic inference: it propagates the probability values of the leaves to the 
intermediate and then to the ‘top’ node. Note that BN-s allow quite complex probabilistic 
relationships, more than what one can do with the AND/OR nodes of fault trees. Note also, that 
the nodes (i.e. variables) can take values from a discrete set or a continuous (but finite) set.  
Bayesian Net Generation 
The SEAM models can be used as the basis for creating the structure of the Bayesian 
Network (BN) models. Fig. 9 shows the structure of the BN model corresponding to the 
system architecture in Fig. 2 and the functional decomposition model in Fig. 5. 
The root (leaf) nodes of the Bayesian network model would correspond to the mission 
variables such as Mission Time and Single Event Environment in Fig. 9. These mission 
nodes determine the strength of environment effects. In Fig. 9, the environment effect 
nodes correspond to Total Ionizing Dosage (TID), Single Event Upset (SEU) and Single 
Event Latch up (SEL).  
 
Fig. 9 Bayesian Network model based on the SEAM model for the embedded system example. 
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The next set of nodes in the BN models correspond to the health of the components. In 
Fig. 9, S1_Health and MC1_Health correspond to the health of the sensor component (S1) 
and the microprocessor (MC1). The health of the components is affected by the 
environment effects. 
Component health affects the performance of the components, which is indicated by 
the quality of the functions provided by the components. So, the next layer in the BN 
corresponds to the functions provided by the component. In Fig. 9, these correspond to the 
nodes –Probe_Env and Calculate_Response. The quality of the lower level functions 
affects the quality of the higher-level functions and hence the overall system performance 
(BN Node System_Function in Fig. 9).  
Additionally, the fault propagation model introduces additional edges between the 
component health and the quality of the functions. This is because the quality of a function 
is not just governed by the health of the component responsible for delivering the function, 
but also the health of other inter-connected components.  In the case of Fig. 9, the 
Calculate_Response function is not only affected by the health of the component providing 
the function (MC1), but also the health of component S1. 
The BN model could help in understanding the reliability of the system function, given 
the current status of the mission variables. It could be useful to study the sensitivity of the 
goodness of the functions to the health of the individual components. 
3. STRUCTURE AND COVERAGE CHECKS 
The integrated modeling environment in SEAM allows cross-referencing of the 
elements in the  
▪ System Architecture Model 
▪ Functional Decomposition Model 
▪ GSN Assurance model. 
This cross referencing allows users to relate parts of the GSN assurance arguments 
(Goals, Strategies, and Solutions) to the relevant components in the system model, the 
functionality provided by the component and any radiation-induced faults associated with 
the component [16]. 
To aid in this effort, the SEAM toolset performs a coverage check which informs the user 
through simple spreadsheet-like tables the coverage from different perspectives.  While this 
is useful even in the context of a simple system presented here, it is particularly useful as the 
system scales up and the assurance argument needs to account for the increasing number of 
components, their inter-dependence in terms of functionality provided and failures propagated. 
The results of a coverage check are presented as a set of tables. These include: 
▪ Parts List:  This table includes hyperlinks to each of the part type models in the parts 
library that is associated with the current system model. The hyperlinks allow the 
user to navigate to the part model and its internal fault model.  Fig. 10 shows the list 
of parts associated with the system in Fig. 2 and parts library in Fig. 4. 
▪ Instance List: This table presents the component instances in the system architecture 
model. For each component instance (row), it shows the corresponding part from the 
part library.  Fig. 11 shows the instance list as part of the coverage check. As shown 
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in this table, it is possible that the multiple instances of the same part (Voltage 
Regulator) are used in the system.   
 
Fig. 10  Coverage check – Parts list. Each row corresponds to a part model in the parts library. 
 
Fig. 11 Coverage check - Instance list.  Each row corresponds to a component instance in 
the system model and its associated part in the part library. 
▪ Function Coverage:  This list presents a summary of the functional decomposition 
model. For each function, it lists the implementing component(s) in the system model.  
Functions that do not have a corresponding implementation component in the system 
are appropriately flagged. This informs the user that either the functionality is not 
implemented in the system or the relationships have not been captured in the functional 
decomposition model. Fig. 12 shows the function coverage table generated as part of 
coverage check for the function decomposition model (Fig. 5) and the system (Fig. 2) 
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Fig. 12 Coverage check – Function Coverage - Each row corresponds to a function in the 
function decomposition model and the component (part) in the system design that 
implements the function. 
▪ Component Coverage:  This table maps component instances in the system model 
to the appropriate function(s) in the functional decomposition model.  It is likely 
that component instances of the same part support different functions in the system.  
Entries that are not related to any function are appropriately flagged.    
▪ GSN Coverage: This table presents the coverage of the assurance argument in the 
GSN model relative to the components in the system.  The table lists the GSN goals 
and solutions for the assurance argument related to each component instance in the 
system. It further identifies the specific GSN goals related to each of the underlying 
component faults, each functional degradation effect that the fault propagates to and 
each mitigation strategy associated with the fault propagation.  
Fig. 13 shows an example GSN coverage table generated as part of the coverage check.  
The first column corresponds to the component instance; the next column corresponds to 
any fault originating from within the component; this is followed by the effect (E) and the 
 
Fig. 13 Coverage check – GSN Coverage: The table maps the parts in the system design 
and their underlying faults to the GSN arguments (goals/ solutions). 
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mitigation response (R) related to the fault propagation. The links to the GSN arguments 
are listed in the next column. Entries with no associated GSN arguments are flagged with 
a red question mark (“?”) symbol. 
The next few columns reveal the status of the specific GSN goal (Developed/ 
In-development), and the result of the argument based on if it meets the specifications or 
not (yes/ no/ partial). “Information Source” indicates if the argument pertains to the specific 
component instance or the part it corresponds to. Action column reveals the user decision 
on the completion status of the argument (completed/needs attention/ ignore). The 
penultimate column allows for traceability and assignment of individual arguments to 
persons. The comments column keeps a record of the comments related to the decisions 
made pertaining to the arguments. 
4. INTEGRATING THE MODELS AND SYSTEMS ANALYSIS – STAR TRACKER EXAMPLE 
Star trackers are embedded systems of a satellite that gather image data from the 
surrounding stars to orient the satellite by comparing the real-time image data to a stored star 
map. Often, a CMOS imaging sensor with a lens is used to gather the real-time data. The data 
is sent through a Kalman filter to help predict the satellite position. The image is filtered to 
reduce image noise and the star positions are determined by identifying the centroids of areas 
of higher light levels. In Fig. 14, the data from the star tracker is processed through the attitude 
determination and control systems, and then sent to the control components to reorient the 
satellite [17]. This satellite control system is used as a baseline to translate a real-world 
embedded system example into SEAM to provide a simple tangible example for the space 
community. As seen in the block diagram, satellite control systems can be complex, therefore 
the star tracker subsystem was chosen to create a simplified model. 
 
Fig. 14 Block diagram representing a satellite control system. The path highlighted in red 
depicts the path of interest translated into SEAM [18]. 
Fig. 15 represents the functional decomposition [19] of the star tracker embedded system. 
The overall function of the system is to orient the satellite. This is achieved by taking the raw 
image data from the CMOS imaging sensor block, represented by the Sensor reference block 
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here. The data is then processed and compared to the stored star map in the Logic block. The 
Compare_to_Stored_Data low-level function is broken out from the Process_Image_Data 
function because the raw image data needs to have noise filtered out and have high light levels 
be identified by software processing before the data can be compared to a stored reference star 
map. The position and attitude data are then translated, and the data is converted to signal 
commands to be sent to the controls and reoriented using the thrusters and reaction devices. 
 
Fig. 15 SEAM model view of a functional decomposition of a star tracker embedded 
system. The top and mid-level functions are represented by blocks with capital 
F(x), and the lowest-level functions are represented by the blocks with lowercase 
f(x). The topmost function represents the overall goal of the star tracker embedded 
system: to orient the satellite. 
Fig. 16 shows the model view of the star tracker system, depicting a simple sensor logic 
reaction embedded system. The power block feeds power to each of the components using 
linear regulators. Power flow is represented by the black paths. The CMOS_Imaging_Sensor 
block represents a direct component, while the Logic, Power, and Controls_Actuators blocks 
represent subsystems. Data is received from the CMOS sensor, processed in the logic block, 
and the reactions are executed with the controls and actuators. Data flow is represented by the 
green paths. 
 
Fig. 16 SEAM model view of the star tracker embedded system physical components. Green 
paths represent signal flow between components, while black paths represent power 
flow between components. Each component has embedded subsystems within its 
block. 
A large range of faults may occur, and must be considered, when designing and working 
with components of a real system. These can be accounted for in the SEAM interface to 
determine propagation paths of the faults to consider how their effects may cause faults in 
other components. Many components in a system can be affected by physical fault causes. 
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For example, in the star tracker embedded system, the focusing lens of the CMOS imager 
may be knocked out of place and become unfocused due to vibration effects on 
launch-vehicle ascent. Another physical fault that affects the imager is represented by a 
dirty lens, which may result in bad imaging data. Electronic components are also often 
affected by radiation effects such as total ionizing dose (TID). In Fig. 17, the total ionizing 
dose fault creates a degraded signal anomaly. The incorrect data then propagates out of the 
signal port to the logic block. The incorrect data enters the logic block where it then flows 
into the microcontroller depicted in Fig. 18 situated within the logic block.  
 
Fig. 17 SEAM model view of the CMOS Sensor block. Various physical faults and 
radiation effects are considered. They are modelled and anomalies caused by the 
faults are propagated out to power and signal ports to other system components. 
 
Fig. 18 SEAM Model View of the microcontroller subsystem within the logic block. The 
radiation effect, single event latch up, is considered like the case in the CMOS 
sensor. Incoming faults from the CMOS image sensor signal port enter the 
microcontroller causing levels of data deviance anomalies, which then propagate 
out to each of the control systems. 
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The incorrect data propagates into the microcontroller from the input port. This creates a 
large data deviation that then propagates out of the respective ports to the Controls_Actuators 
subsystem. The fault then enters each of the orientation controls from the respective incoming 
signal ports shown in Fig. 19.    
 
Fig. 19 SEAM model view of the Controls and Actuators block. Faults enter from the 
incoming signal ports and effect the controls, which then cause the reaction devices 
to have degraded reactions. Note that the thrusters are controlled using material 
ports instead of signal ports, as thrusters are controlled by hydraulic valves and not 
electric signals. 
One of the orientation control blocks is depicted in Fig. 20. The incorrect data from the 
total ionizing dose radiation effect is evaluated as propagating to either cause an unreadable 
signal resulting in no system response or create a large orientation command inaccuracy 
resulting in the reaction wheels further disorienting the satellite. 
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Fig. 20 SEAM model view of the Reaction Wheel Control block. The effects of the faults 
from the CMOS imager are shown creating effects of different reorientation 
inaccuracies, including a case where the system fails to recognize a readable star 
map causing an error of no system response. 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
This paper presents a web browser-based platform for radiation performance modeling 
and assurance of space systems called System Engineering Assurance and Modeling 
(SEAM), developed at Vanderbilt University with NASA support. It combines three 
modeling aspects together to allow radiation assessment. The first aspect is a SysML-based 
system description aspect that describes the system parts, their interconnection, and the 
origination and propagation of radiation-induced faults through the system. This system 
description aspect of SEAM contains two diagrams not found in the canonical SysML diagram 
set, which are the functional decomposition diagram (FCD) and the fault propagation diagram 
(FPD), which are key to capturing the introduction and propagation of faults. The second aspect 
of SEAM is based on Goal Structuring Notation (GSN), a visual argument language that enables 
the description of an assurance case, including the requirements, goals, strategies and evidence 
that are used to argue that the system will perform well in the space environment. The third 
aspect of SEAM is the generation of reliability artifacts, namely Bayesian Networks and fault 
trees, that are made possible by the FCD and FPD system diagrams. SEAM can extract the 
topologies of Bayesian nets and fault trees for radiation-induced faults from the system 
description and export them in standard formats to BN and FT evaluation applications.  
Taken together, the SEAM capabilities allow the assessment of the radiation performance 
of a spacecraft without relying on intensive radiation testing campaigns, or extensive physical 
knowledge of the electronic components. The SEAM platform can be used to evaluate any 
space system but is especially useful for small satellite applications with short development 
timeframes and significant use of commercial-off-the shelf parts.  
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